Emilio Sanford, in his post strategy Quine's ontological explains Quine's famous phrase "to be is to be the value of a bound variable", saying that according to Quine the best way to determine what exists is a good starting theory on the world (we mean: a scientific theory) and determine which are the ontological presuppositions of that theory. Then associated with the idea of \u200b\u200bQuine's theory of object Meinong, who wanted to build a science of all objects, free from prejudice in favor of reality, which could also address the possible objects, unthinkable, unreal. There would be relativism is Quine (define what is in reference to a specific theory about the world ...) is in Meinong (define what is always subject within individual contexts or domains).
I continue to see (like everyone else, in general) a deep rift between Quine and Meinong, well highlighted in the book of Berto Existence is not logical (but also Sanford points out the crucial issue of gifts that can not ... ), and I think the gap is to be traced back to the gap between the phenomenological method and analytical method: the perspective of Quine reflects the great attention given by the analytic philosophy of the results of natural and exact sciences, while the prospect of Meinong reflects the priority interest of phenomenology to the experiences and their classification, and is attentive to the products of the imagination, and then projected into the art.
The current ontology is then crossed by this division, but that may prove fruitful if we become aware of the history and motivations behind the two different philosophical perspectives, the phenomenological and analytical, and especially if you try to get them in communication and exchange ratio considering their common root in the broader purpose of philosophy in general.
I continue to see (like everyone else, in general) a deep rift between Quine and Meinong, well highlighted in the book of Berto Existence is not logical (but also Sanford points out the crucial issue of gifts that can not ... ), and I think the gap is to be traced back to the gap between the phenomenological method and analytical method: the perspective of Quine reflects the great attention given by the analytic philosophy of the results of natural and exact sciences, while the prospect of Meinong reflects the priority interest of phenomenology to the experiences and their classification, and is attentive to the products of the imagination, and then projected into the art.
The current ontology is then crossed by this division, but that may prove fruitful if we become aware of the history and motivations behind the two different philosophical perspectives, the phenomenological and analytical, and especially if you try to get them in communication and exchange ratio considering their common root in the broader purpose of philosophy in general.
